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Abstract 
 
Prior articles and reports have named Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads as a 
plausible indicator of default risk. In this report, the authors present a significant 
correlation between CDS spreads and two other more acknowledged methods of 
measuring default risk probabilities; the modified Merton model and credit ratings 
from the rating institute Moody’s. The tests are implemented by Spearman’s rank 
correlation with data obtained between the years 2008 to 2011. The sample is based 
on 30 firms in Europe and America, respectively, and is chosen after the number of 
outstanding CDS contracts in November 2012. In order to get as accurate results as 
possible, the selection of firms are separated into financial and non-financial sectors: 
five financial and 25 non-financial firms, respectively for each continent.  The CDS 
spreads are obtained from 5-year maturity contracts and are taken from Thomson 
Reuters DataStream. The variables needed to calculate the modified Merton are 
obtained from the same source as well as from comprehensive Excel files provided by 
professor Aswath Damodaran at NY University. 
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1. Introduction 
A financial actor’s exposures to systematic and nonsystematic risks have to be taken 
into account when investing in the financial markets.  
Systematic risk is the type of risk that cannot be diversified away; it depends on the 
return from the whole financial market (Hull 2012). For instance, a portfolio of stocks 
with different types of volatility can be diversified in order to reach a minimum level 
of risk but cannot erase other forces such as bank solvency, interest rates and 
economic shocks which are a part of systematic risk (Schwarcz 2008). 
Nonsystematic risk is the risk that is confined only to a certain asset, firm or industry 
and can be diversified away, unlike macroeconomic risk (systematic). Examples of 
nonsystematic risk could be union related strikes or management risk (Franklin 
Templeton Investments 2012).  
In our thesis, we will put the emphasis on the latter, i.e. nonsystematic risk. Credit 
risk, or default risk, which is a type of nonsystematic risk, is an important risk for 
financial institutions to measure and manage (Hull 2012). Credit risk derives from the 
likelihood that a firm, which could work as a borrower and a counterparty, often in 
transactions with derivatives, will default (Hull 2012).  For instance, the risk that a 
firm issuing a bond not will be able to pay back the par value and interest, i.e. not be 
able to pay back their debts, is defined as default risk (Garlappi, Shu & Yan 2008). 
The attention for credit risk in the financial markets has increased during the last 
years due to the unstable financial climate that have been seen since the start of the 
financial crisis in 2007 and today’s debt crisis in Europe. The assessment of the credit 
risk linked to different financial actors – irrespectively if they are sovereign states or 
individual firms – has become an increasingly important and complex issue in the 
financial market. In order to get an estimate of the exposure to credit risk, there are 
some methods that can be applicable.  
The credit risk is measured and classified in rating systems that are managed by 
different ratings agencies acting on different levels and parts of the markets both on 
local level as well as worldwide.   
On a global level there are three main rating agencies in the world today: Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch (Christiansen et al. 2004). These agencies all have their 
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own way of defining the ratings, although having a similar approach (Christiansen et 
al. 2004). 
The purpose of these types of ratings is to independently and objectively inform about 
issuers ability to meet their financial commitments in the future. With the ratings in 
mind investment decisions can more reliably be made and investors become more 
protected, since they bring better transparency in the capital markets (Christiansen et 
al. 2004). 
Investors, savers, governments, issuers and borrowers, for instance, are the typical 
users of credit ratings. Regarding issuers, they benchmark pricing against ratings, and 
investors use ratings in the decision to invest in a security. Investors have a consensus 
that a minimum credit rate must be used in investment to debt (Christiansen et al. 
2004).  
Credit ratings also facilitate communication of creditworthiness between 
counterparties and are working as instruments for investors in portfolio management 
(Christiansen et al. 2004).   
1.1 Risk assessment and reduction 
Different financial activities usually have an immediate exposure to credit risk. 
Measuring such risk is therefore crucial to forecast the losses that could occur if a, for 
example, counterparty does not fulfill its financial commitments (Byström 2005).  
Investing in credit derivatives can be helpful for investors to manage and reduce 
credit risk (Byström 2005). In theory, the higher risk you take, the higher the pay-off 
from your investment and at the same time, a higher risk of losing a large part of your 
investment, all depending on the creditworthiness of the counterparty in the financial 
contract (Hull 2012). 
The most commonly traded credit derivative is a credit default swap (CDS) (Hull 
2012). Briefly, a CDS is a credit derivative that can be defined as an insurance 
contract between two parties, the protection buyer/holder and the protection 
seller/issuer of the contract, against a credit event involving a reference entity 
(Byström 2005). The reference entity’s credit status therefore helps to determine the 
value on the CDS (Jacobs et al. 2010). Such a reference entity can be a bond or a loan 
of a financial institution (firm) or of a sovereign institution (state) (Giglio 2010). So-
	   5	  
called single-name CDSs are the most frequently used when trading with credit 
derivatives (Hull 2012).  
The CDS contract includes a periodic CDS premium, often called “spread”, which is 
the cost of insuring against a firm’s probability of default. The CDS spread is a 
(often) quarterly serial of payments that the buyer pays the seller in case of a default 
by the reference entity (Hull 2012).  
An increase in the CDS spread implies that the risk of default of institutions increases 
(Giglio 2010). Since a CDS contract includes counterparty risk, the spread indicates 
both the likelihood of default of the reference entity (a specific firm) and the 
correlation between its default and the default of the protection seller (Giglio 2010). 
Consequently, this information is valuable for how financial markets identify the 
default risk on corporate or sovereign debt (Noeth & Sengupta 2012). 
Spreads have two main areas of importance; CDS spreads can be used as a good 
pricing estimator of default risk of the underlying reference entity since it is often 
traded on standardized conditions on specific maturities (Zhang, Zhou & Zhu 2005). 
However, in general, the contracts are traded Over the Counter (OTC) (Giglio 2010). 
CDS spreads also have the trait that they respond more quickly to anomalies in credit 
conditions in the short run compared to, for instance, bond spreads (Zhang, Zhou & 
Zhu 2005). 
An alternative way to estimate credit risk to CDS spreads is to find credit risk 
information directly from the market. If there is credit risk in the market, market 
prices could include risk information and by calculating on basis of this information 
there are ways to measure credit risk. Byström (2006) presents a modified “spread 
sheet” model of Merton’s (1974) default probability model. Merton (1974) examines 
a firm’s equity and debt relative to its underlying assets. In order to calculate this, 
Merton (1974) extract figures and volatilities from stock prices resulting in specific 
probabilities of default. Compared to the traditional Merton model, the modified 
model takes some assumptions that makes the model more easily calculated, and 
results in a firm’s “distance-to-default” probability.  
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1.2 Our task related to the calculation of credit risks 
The aim of this thesis is to give a contribution to an in-scientific explanatory 
discussion by comparing different credit risk indicators to estimate the level of default 
risk. Generally speaking, we want to show how different risk methodologies “behave” 
in relation to some common parameters in the credit risks environment.  
In order to succeed with this ambition, we have collected a mass of empirical material 
consisting of data from 30 American and 30 European firms. The size of the empirical 
material allows us to carry out statistical tests in order to investigate into different 
types of risk indicators.  
This empirical approach and a statistical calculation give us the opportunity to 
accomplish the main purpose of this Bachelor Thesis to compare and examine  
• Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads 
• Credit ratings from Moody’s credit rating agency  
• The modified Merton model.  
Our objective is to explain the meaning of these three measures, find whether there is 
any correlation between them, call attention to which differences there are, and on 
basis of the results achieved, draw conclusions for the benefit of an improved 
discussion on risk assessment. Credit ratings from Moody´s credit rating institute are 
acknowledged by the market as an accepted measure of default risk (Daniels & Jensen 
2005) and the modified Merton model is based on a well-used traditional estimator of 
default risk (Byström 2006). Therefore, we are using them as a benchmark in relation 
to CDS spreads in order to analyze if CDS spreads are plausible indicators of default 
risk. This can be summarized into our main purpose: 
“Are CDS spreads a statistical significant indicator of credit risk compared to 
acknowledged credit risk measurements?” 
 A rise in CDS spreads implies that the risk of default of institutions increases (Giglio 
2010). We are therefore hoping that our results will show that when CDS spreads rise, 
there is a downfall in distance-to-default (the modified Merton model) and Moody´s 
credit ratings and by that find a correlation between these two acknowledged methods 
of measuring default risk and CDS spreads.  
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The rationale behind our chosen topic is that we personally have been increasingly 
interested in credit risk in the last years due to the tremulous financial climate in the 
financial markets. 
The thesis is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 highlights which studies that 
already exist on this topic, Chapter 3 explains the theory behind the credit risk 
indicators we are using, Chapter 4 presents our data, Chapter 5 describes the 
methodology in our calculations, Chapter 6 the results, Chapter 7 the analysis, and 
finally Chapter 8 contains the conclusion. 
2. Previous research 
Measuring credit risk has been a topic – not unsurprisingly – in numerous scientific 
papers during last years. For instance, Jacobs et al. (2010) have written a paper that 
examines the relationship between CDS spreads and credit ratings in order to clarify 
how market participants recognize and price credit risk. While Berndt et al. (2008) 
investigates the price variation over time when being exposed to U.S. corporate 
default risk, based on Moody’s and CDS market rates as measures of probability of 
default. 
Jacobs et al. (2010) implement a similar survey, yet a bit more extensive than ours, by 
examine 391 5-year CDS contracts using Bloomberg as the data source over a time 
period from 2003 to 2008. They model the CDS spreads and also the variation 
between CDS spreads and credit ratings. Also, they study the scope of spreads for 
every rating and what happens to the variation scope of spreads if the credit quality 
gets worse (Jacobs et al. 2010).  
Furthermore, Jacobs et al. (2010) investigates the dependent factors that affect the 
variation scope of spreads. Similar to our thesis, they also give examples of 
methodologies on how to valuate CDSs. With the dependent factors, they seek to find 
an explanation of the variation scope of spreads of reference entities that have equal 
ratings. 
Jacobs et al (2010) find that there is a broad variation in the observed CDS spreads for 
firms compared to their given credit rating, although CDS spreads are related to credit 
ratings.  
Concerning Berndt et al. (2008), they provide a survey on 93 firms and can present a 
strong explanatory degree between actual and risk-neutral default probabilities. When 
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examining CDS rates, they see variations over time in spreads for a certain default 
probability. Berndt et al. (2008) concludes that CDS spreads are highly dependent on 
volatilities in the stock market when they examine this on firms’ specific volatility on 
probabilities of default. 
When it comes to modeling default risk by the Merton model, Byström (2006) is, in 
his paper “Merton Unraveled: A Flexible Way of Modeling Default Risk”, presenting 
a simplified version of this model of which we are using as the main source when 
describing and calculating on the modified Merton measure. 
Information on CDSs, credit rating agencies and the Merton model are in general well 
documented in earlier papers and publications. Moreover, as described above, studies 
concerning the relation between CDS spreads and credit ratings have also been done. 
However, to our knowledge, there is no previous work on examining the statistical 
relationship between CDS spreads, credit ratings and Merton’s distance-to-default 
measure. 
3. Theory 
3.1 Credit Default Swaps and CDS Spreads 
As mentioned in the introduction, the credit derivative CDS is a financial contract 
which objective is to protect against the risk that a reference entity (a firm) will not be 
able to meet its financial obligations; and consequently defaults. If a default occurs, it 
is called a credit event (Hull 2012, Byström 2005). 
A CDS means trading with pure credit risk since it is not linked with other likely 
risks, for example interest rate risk or foreign exchange risk. By not transferring the 
underlying asset, a CDS trades the credit risk from one actor to another (Byström 
2005).  CDS contracts are usually traded Over The Counter (OTC) and could 
therefore be customized by the issuer and the holder of the contract (Giglio 2010). 
However, standardized contracts, concentrated around specific maturities, are 
commonly used as well (Byström 2005). According to Giglio (2010), a contract with 
a maturity of 5 years is relatively standardized. 
In case of a credit event the seller is forced to compensate the buyer. The 
compensation is often designed in two ways; either by physical settlement or by cash 
settlement. The first term means that the holder of the CDS can give the issuer of the 
CDS the defaulted bond in exchange of the par value of the bond (Noeth & Sengupta 
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2012). The CDS could in this case be seen as a contingent put option, it is only 
activated if the reference entity defaults (Skora 1998).   
The second term implies that the issuer can pay the holder the difference between the 
bond’s par value and its current market price of the reference entity that it still holds 
(Noeth & Sengupta 2012).  
If a credit event does not happen, the holder pays a fee, or spread, based on the value 
insured to the issuer until the financial contract expires (Noeth & Sengupta 2012). 
The spread, also called premium, is quoted as a percentage of the notional value that 
is insured (Giglio 2010). The CDS spread percentage is normally expressed in basis 
points (bps), where one percent is 100 basis points (Zhang, Zhou & Zhu 2005). 	  
Figure 3.1. Illustration of a CDS1 
 
	  
 
For instance, if the seller is insuring 1 million dollars to the buyer on a defaultable 
bond and the annual spread is 400 basis points, then the buyer has to pay the seller 
100 basis points of the 1 million dollars, which is 10 000 dollars, four times per year 
(if there are quarterly payments). The buyer of the swap is obliged to pay the seller 
this annual premium for protection from credit risk (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2011).  
One important aspect of CDSs is that the contract can help the buyer to increase its 
creditworthiness on the outstanding loan. For instance, if the issuer of the CDS has a 
credit rating of Aaa (top ranking); the insured debt would obtain the same rating.  If a 
Baa-rated bond were to be incorporated with insurance on a CDS contract making it 
equivalent to an Aaa-rated bond, the premium/spread on the swap would be the yield 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Based on professor Ian H. Giddy’s, New York University, diagram introduced at the seminar on “Risk 
Management in Financial Institutions” at Sogang University, Seoul, October 2011. 
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spread between the Aaa-rated bond and the Baa-rated bond (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 
2011). 
Tang & Yan (2012) write that changes in CDS spreads, according to the Merton 
model, are mainly driven by “leverage, asset volatility, and market conditions such as 
interest rates”. Another factor in CDS spread changes is risk aversion of investors in 
the market, making the spreads potentially increase when investors becoming more 
risk averse (Tang & Yan 2012).  
To determine the price on a CDS, it is significant to look at the exposure of credit risk 
on the reference entity. To calculate this, three main methods can be used. The first 
method is to look at different credit institutes’ (e.g. Moody’s) rating for an individual 
firm, concerning its capability to meet its financial commitments. The second is to use 
accounting information to measure credit risk. The third method is to find information 
of the credit risk from the stock market, using the earlier mentioned modified Merton 
model (Byström 2005). 
3.1.1 Credit ratings impact on CDS pricing 
Credit ratings are the most significant informants on credit risk, and they have a great 
impact on CDS prices when an announcement of a rating agency is made (Batta 
2011). They calculate different rating levels on an individual firm’s ability to meet its 
financial commitments (e.g. repayment of loans) (Byström 2005). Credit ratings are 
important guidelines for credit quality of financial institutions and different reference 
entities (Daniels & Jensen 2005). A significant part of the spread on a CDS is 
reflected in the rating of a reference entity, thus, this rating stands for the 
compensation required to insure against the pure credit risk of a firm. If this is true, 
CDS spreads and credit ratings of the reference entity should correlate to a certain 
degree (Jacobs et al. 2010). 
3.1.2 Accounting information’s impact on CDS pricing 
Another determinant when pricing CDSs is accounting information. Batta (2011) 
writes that it has been documented that prices on CDSs react to quarterly reports by 
firms. When adding accounting information to market models it increases their 
predictive relevance for the prices on CDSs.  
Some criticisms regarding accounting information are that this information is not 
updated contemporary with the market and is also updated with too large time spaces. 
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Moreover, accounting information is only based on historical information, and do not 
take the market’s anticipation of the future into account. There is also a risk that it has 
been manipulations with the accountancy (Byström 2006). 
It is however not clear if the CDS market integrates the information directly from 
accounting reports, or just uses some of the accounting information to look at the debt 
and equity security prices, and the credit ratings (Batta 2011). The Merton (1974) 
model, for example, relies on the firm’s equities, debts, volatility, and stock prices. 
These variables may already be included in the firm’s accounting reports (Batta 
2011). 
Regarding credit ratings, they are less costly and time consuming than examine 
accounting reports in a regular way, since accounting information is often already 
included in the ratings (Batta 2011). 
3.2 Moody’s credit ratings and rating methodology 
Rating agencies purpose is to give reliable ratings on issuers’ creditworthiness in the 
financial market (Hull 2012). We have decided to use Moody’s credit ratings in this 
thesis. The motivation for using Moody’s is that when researching for our thesis, we 
found that many of the previous research reports and papers indeed were using 
Moody’s as the main benchmark. Moreover, it was easy to gain access to the ratings.  
Moody’s uses a rating classification – highest to lowest – of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, 
Caa, Ca and C. The rating Aaa indicates that the (for example) bond has a small risk 
of defaulting. Bonds with ratings better than Baa are seen as the boundary for 
investment grade (Hull 2012).  
There are also subcategories, Moody’s uses Aa1, Aa2, and Aa3 for its Aa category, 
and A1, A2 and A3 for its A category etc. The highest rating along with the two of the 
lowest ratings is normally not divided into subcategories (Hull 2012). Bonds that have 
large risk of defaulting are denoted as non-investment grades, that is, below Baa3 
(Daniels & Jensen 2005). 
Some general criticisms that rating agencies have received are that they are updating 
the ratings too infrequently (Byström 2006) and only react to actual events, instead of 
forecasting them (Christiansen et al. 2004). Though, it is the management of the firm 
that is the basis of their analysis, consequently, the management could be able to 
conceal bad financial status (Christiansen et al. 2004).  
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3.2.1 Moody’s rating method 
Moody’s uses both a qualitative and a quantitative approach to determine its credit 
ratings. Moody’s examines the macroeconomic situation (the setting of politics, 
economy and industry), then assesses each firm’s operating situation, and concludes 
with evaluating the firm’s financial strategy. Emphasis is put on financial protection 
in the future, not only on historical information. These approaches are almost the 
same for all of the industries (Christiansen et. al. 2004). 
In terms of qualitative factors, Moody’s examines a firm’s management, financial 
pliability etc. (Christiansen et. al 2004). And concerning the quantitative factors, 
Moody’s looks at, for instance, a firm’s capital sufficiency, its profitability, its 
investment/asset risk, and solvency and liquidity (Christiansen et al. 2004). Likewise 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s gives the different variables a rating and then calculates 
an average value as the final grade. 
For banks, Moody’s is using a different rating classification system, namely Bank 
Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR). The difference from the rating system explained 
above is that BFSR are not evaluating the probability of banks’ failure of meeting 
their timely payments (creditworthiness). BFSR rather measure the probability that a 
certain bank will need help from third parties, for instance from the management or 
official institutions (Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 2012). 
BFSR consider factors of risk in the bank’s business settings, such as the status of the 
economy, the financial system, and how the bank’s regulations and supervision is 
working (Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 2012). 
The rating scale in this case goes from A to E (A, B, C, D, E), with subdivisions of 
(+) and (-) for ratings below the A category and above the E category (Moody’s 
Investors Service, Inc. 2012). 
3.3 The modified Merton model 
One of the most famous models for estimating default risk is the Merton (1974) 
model. The model estimates a firms credit risk by replicating a call option on its 
equity using the firm’s assets as the underlying asset. A European call option is in-
the-money when the spot-price exceeds the strike-price at maturity T, i.e. the pay-off 
will be: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑆! − 𝐾, 0  
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The Merton model works in a similar way. A firm’s asset in time t is given by A, and 
is financed by equity, E, and a zero-coupon debt D, of the par value K2 maturing at 
time T (Wang 2009). The capital structure is given by the following balance sheet: 𝐴 = 𝐸 + 𝐷 
The firm’s debts are all mapped into a zero-coupon debt, which matures at time T. If 𝐴 > 𝐾, the debt holders will receive the full invested amount and the shareholders 
value will still be 𝐴 − 𝐾. If 𝐾 > 𝐴, the firms debt exceeds its assets and the firm will 
therefore default (Wang 2009). The debt holders will have the first claim on the 
residual asset A and shareholders will receive a payoff of 0. The equity pay-off can 
now be shown at maturity T (Wang 2009): 𝐸 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴 − 𝐾, 0) 
As previously mentioned, this pay-off replicates the pay-off of a European call option. 
Since Merton’s model (1974) is replicating a call option, it’s applicable to use the 
Black-Scholes (1973) pricing formula to calculate the default risk. The Merton model 
uses the Black-Scholes formula to calculate what is called distance-to-default which 
is a measure of creditworthiness of the equity-issuing firm, using the asset value and 
asset volatility. For this to be possible, the Merton model will have to follow the same 
assumptions as the Black-Scholes formula.  
The Merton model is constructed in the following way (Hull, Nelken & White 2004) 
where today’s equity price is given by: 𝐸! =   𝐴!𝑁 𝑑! − 𝐾𝑒!!"𝑁(𝑑!) 
Where 𝑑! and 𝑑! is given by: 
𝑑! =    ln(𝐴! 𝐾)+ (𝑟 − 12𝜎!!)(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝜎! (!!!)  
 𝑑! =   𝑑! −   𝜎! (𝑇 − 𝑡) 
Where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The instrumental value of amount of money stated on a bond. 	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As previously mentioned, the firm’s debts are all mapped into one homogenous debt 
along with the residual equity (𝐴 = 𝐸 + 𝐷), which is referred to as K. The term 𝐴! 𝐾 
will be referred to as the leverage ratio (Byström 2006).  
Furthermore, the relationship between equity and asset volatility are given by the 
expression: 
𝜎! =   𝐴𝐸𝑁(𝑑!)𝜎! 
The model used in this thesis is based on the original Merton model but modified in a 
“spread sheet” version (Byström 2006). The model takes three assumptions regarding 
the original Merton model: 
• The drift term (𝑟 − !!𝜎!!)(𝑇 − 𝑡) is assumed to be “small” 
• 𝑁(𝑑!) is assumed to be “close to one” 
• The book value of debt is used is used to calculate the leverage ratio. 
The reason for the first assumption is that in most situations, the drift term is found to 
be small in relativity to the 𝑙𝑛  (𝐴/𝐾) term. It has also been empirically proven that to 
actually estimate the drift rate of stocks or other assets has been difficult. Therefore, 
the drift term is often considered to be zero (Byström 2006). The second assumption 
of 𝑁 𝑑!   being close to one, is based on the observation that only in extreme cases 
where 𝐴 is close to 𝐾 (the option is at-the-money) and the underlying asset volatility 
is very high, 𝑁(𝑑!) significantly differs from 1 (Byström 2006). The third and final 
assumption, that the book value is used to calculate leverage ratio and not the market 
value. In theory, when adding the equity value and debt, the market value should be 
used, as in the Merton model. The fact that only equity has a quoted market value 
introduces an error when adding the value of equity to the book value of debt. The 
method of using book value is also justified by the fact that the book value of debt 
that has to be paid back in case of a default and not the market value (Byström 2006).  
𝐸 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦	  𝐴 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	  𝐾 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡	  𝑇 − 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑡𝑜  𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑜𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡	  𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝑁 𝑑1/𝑑2 =   𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	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If we elaborate the model and draw back to the first assumption that the drift term is 
smaller than 𝑙𝑛  (𝐴/𝐾), and making the common assumption that time to maturity 
(𝑡 → 𝑇) of the debt is one year, the expression of time to default can be reduced to 
(Byström 2006): 
𝐷𝑇𝐷3 = ln(𝐴 /𝐾)𝜎!  
 
If we furthermore consider the relationship between 𝜎!  and 𝜎!  and our second 
assumption of 𝑁 𝑑!  being close to one, we can replace 𝜎! with !!    !!!! . By doing this, 
we get (Byström 2006): 
𝐷𝑇𝐷 =    ln(𝐴 /𝐾)𝜎!    𝐸 𝐾  
Finally, if we define the leverage ratio as 𝐿 =   !! , we can further simplify the 
expression of distance-to-default as: 
𝐷𝑇𝐷 =    ln(1 𝐿)𝜎!(1− 𝐿) =    ln(𝐿)(𝐿 − 1) 1𝜎! 
In order to only use observable parameters, we also have to make the assumption that 
the leverage ratio 𝐿, can be calculated as 
𝐿 = 𝐾𝐾 + 𝐸 
(Byström 2006). 
3.3.1 Argumentation for choosing the modified Merton 
The main reason for using the modified Merton model in our report is first and 
foremost the simplicity of its compounding. By taking the three modified Merton 
model assumptions into account, we can calculate an accurate distance-to-default 
measure close to the original Merton model.  
The original Merton model also imposes problems since the volatility and the amount 
of debt is assumed to be constant over time. There is no empirical evidence that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Distance to default, DTD. 
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supports these assumptions, and a dynamic modeling of both debt levels and volatility 
will probably enhance the performances of the default measure (Byström 2006).  
Furthermore, the Merton model tends, along with other implementations of the model, 
to be analytically complicated and continuously intensive (Wang 2009). 
The simplicity of the modified Merton model also makes it more applicable when 
using dynamic volatility and debt level than the original Merton model since 
contingent claims analysis is needed to back out 𝐴 and  (Byström 2006).  
The assumptions of the modified Merton model are also backed up by other reports. 
The level of volatility is noticeable higher for most severely distressed firms than 
moderately distressed firms (Curry, Elmer & Fissel 2001). The leverage ratio (𝐿) or 
the amount due to pay creditors relative to the actual value of the firm, along with the 
equity volatility, is also an important indicator of distress in a firm (Byström 2006 and 
Curry, Elmer & Fissel 2001).   
Though the modified Merton model has its advantages, there are some concerns that 
need to be mentioned. The modified Merton model is, as the name indicates, a 
modified model, and since three assumptions are made in the model to simplify the 
model, it does not give an equal measurement of credit risk as the original model. 
However, in Byströms study (2006) the errors made by the modified model are 30 
percent or less (for probability of default  < 20 percent), and for most practical 
situations the errors are much smaller than that. Furthermore, the errors from the 
modified Merton model are quite small compared to those caused by other 
deficiencies in the original Merton model, for instance the assumption of constant 
equity volatility and the use of backward looking balance sheet data (Byström 2006).  
Despite the inaccuracies of the modified Merton model, the ranking of firms 
according to creditworthiness is almost identical. Since our main objective is to 
analyze the correlation between this model and CDS spreads using the Spearman rank 
correlation tests (further discussed in chapter 5), it is of importance that the original 
Merton model matches the modified version. 
4. Empirical data used in our thesis 
Demarcation 
To delineate our thesis we have chosen 60 specific firms to examine, of which 30 are 
European and 30 are American. 25 firms from each continent are non-financials 
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institutions (non-specific industries), and, consequently, five firms (from each 
continent) are financial institutions.  
We have made this distinction because of the fact that a financial institution, such as a 
bank, is highly leveraged and not so sensitive to changes in leverage compared to an 
average firm; this means that the distance-to-default does not change much when the 
leverage changes. The usage of the modified Merton model is therefore better suitable 
than the original in this case, since it is not crucial to estimate the exact capital 
structure (Byström 2006). The reason we distinguish European and American markets 
is because the U.S. has a more widespread financial culture by the use of high-yield 
securities (Cernicky 2012) and that we can investigate the difference in correlation 
between the two.  
Data Sample 
Primarily, to decide which firms that should be included in the survey, we chose firms 
based on the number of CDS contracts outstanding today (November 2012, beginning 
with the highest in descending order) from Markit Group’s free pricing report (2012). 
We then made sure that those firms’ stock price information, leverage ratio 
information and CDS spreads also were available in the other sources used (the full 
list of firms with respective number of outstanding contracts, as well as those firms 
for which we could not find sufficient information, are listed in Appendix A).  
The three main data sources that we are using are the Markit Group’s free CDS 
pricing report (2012), professor Aswath Damodaran’s (Stern School of Business at 
New York University) updated Excel data files, and Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
To find CDS spreads and the variables needed to calculate the modified Merton 
measure, we needed to collect a significant amount of data.  CDS spreads for the 
firms could be found directly from Thomson Reuters DataStream. We gathered time 
series data of daily CDS spreads for each firm. We only chose 5-year maturity CDS 
contracts (these are often seen as a standardized contract).  
Concerning the modified Merton model, we needed to collect daily stock prices, using 
Thomson Reuters DataStream, for each firm over our determined period of time in 
order to calculate the equity volatility. Additionally, we needed to collect the leverage 
ratio for each firm, and these did we obtain from Professor Aswath Damodaran’s 
detailed Excel data files covering a significant amount of firms in the world. Using 
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the equity volatility together with the leverage ratio, we could define the modified 
Merton’s distance-to-default for a firm (Byström 2006). 
To obtain credit ratings for each firm we are using rates set by Moody’s from the 
official website. A description of Moody’s rating methodology for probability of 
default was given in chapter 3. 
Noticeably, we had to replace some of the firms in retrospect since there were not 
sufficient information on CDS spreads or leverage ratios for every year. However, 
concerning Moody’s ratings, we could not simply find any information for some years 
for J.C. Penney Firm, Inc., Peugeot S.A. and Gas Natural SDG S.A. 
The time period for the data we use in this thesis is 2007-12-31 to 2011-12-31. The 
daily observations for the stock prices and the CDS spreads make a total of 250 
(number of trading days in a year) observations per year.  
While assembling the data we also found that some of the firms had changed names 
during the limited time period; Fifth & Pacific Firms, Inc. was formerly Liz Claiborne 
(changed name during 2012), Macy’s Inc. was named Federated Department Stores in 
2006, British Telecommunications PBL LTD Firm is listed as BT Group PLC and 
The Jones Group Inc. was formerly Jones Apparel Group, Inc. 
All of the assembled data was imported into Excel files and SPSS where we did the 
necessary calculations needed for our statistical testing.  
Criticism of sources 
Regarding the validity of the sources used when collecting CDS spreads it is of 
importance to be aware of possible inadequacies, since the price information is based 
on the degree of voluntary cooperation on market analyses from financial actors. In 
Mayordomo et al. (2010) it reads that Bloomberg’s CDS data has a better follow up 
process than for example Thomson Reuters Datastream. Unfortunately, we do not 
have access to another source. 
5. Method 
In this part, we explain the methods we are using in order to implement our bachelor 
thesis calculations. By comparing and examine these specific measures of risk, we 
have chosen a topic that both take a theoretical and empirical viewpoint into 
consideration. Moreover, we are using statistical methods to test our data and to come 
up with the results.  
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Excel calculations 
When having obtained all the necessary data for the CDS spreads, the modified 
Merton measure and the credit ratings, we imported the data into Excel files where we 
did the calculations. Firstly, we calculated the modified Merton’s “distance-to-
default” for every firm for each year in the non-financial and the financial sector, 
respectively. Secondly, we calculated the average spread for each year for every firm. 
Moody’s firm ratings for each year could just be imported from its website into the 
Excel file. 
In addition, we calculated the average modified Merton’s distance-to-default and the 
average CDS spread for each firm over the whole time period (four years). 
Our main interest is to find the correlation between these credit risk indicators. We 
started by ranking each firm’s modified Merton measure with the CDS spreads for 
each year, in order to see if the ranking order showed a connection to a certain degree 
between the two measures. We then did the same for CDS spreads and Moody’s 
credit ratings. The credit ratings were converted from letters into a numerical rating 
going from 1 to 21, where 21 is the best rating. For banks, which are provided with a 
different rating methodology, we converted the letters into a numerical rating going 
from 1 to 12, where 12 is the best rating. Since JPMorgan Chase & CO, MBIA 
insurance and Morgan Stanley are not rated as banks and receives a rating from 1 to 
21, they are divided by 1,75 (21 divided by 12) to give an accurate rating in relation to 
the bank rating 1 to 12.  The full list on rating conversion can be found in Appendix 
C. 
Statistical tests 
When ranking statistical material of pairwise observations and rank these two 
variables against each other (after the X- and the Y-variable), it´s applicable to use the 
Spearman rank correlation, or Spearman’s “rho”. Spearman’s rho always takes a 
value between -1 and 1. Receiving a result of 1 means that there is a perfect 
correlation and the result of -1 being that it is a perfect negative correlation (Körner & 
Wahlgren 2010). 
Spearman’s rho is not sensitive for either outliers or unnatural fluctuations in the data 
since the method substitutes the initial data values with their specific ranks (De Veaux 
et al. 2012). Spearman’s rho does not urge that there must be a linear trend when 
measuring consistency between variables. Spearman’s rho is called a non-parametic 
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or a distribution-free method, since it is not as distinctive as the Normal model for 
two variables, Spearman’s rho rather measures association, and it also has no 
parameter that it is linked or tied to (De Veaux et al. 2012). 
Spearman’s rho is calculated in the following way; the lowest value in one category 
(e.g. X) gets replaced by the number 1, the second lowest value gets replaced by 
number 2, etc., until the highest value is replaced by the number n. The same method 
in the ranking is used for the other category (e.g. Y). The results can later be shown in 
a scatterplot to analyze the general trend: a linear trend, or a more bent trend, for 
example. If there is an extreme outlier in the data, the ranking method just sees it as 
the highest or the lowest value, no matter how extreme it really is (De Veaux et al. 
2012). 
The Spearman’s rho formula is expressed in the following way: 
𝑟! = 1  −    6Σ𝑑!!𝑛(𝑛! − 1) 
Where 𝑑!  is the differential between the rank numbers in the 𝑖!!  pair (Körner & 
Wahlgren 2010).   
The Spearman rank correlation tests were made with the statistics program SPSS. By 
inserting our data from every year we chose the correlate function and selected two-
tailed Spearman test. The correlation for every year appeared in boxes with respective 
statistical significance. The boxes in our results are copied directly from SPSS.  
When testing whether the correlation between the credit risk indicators were 
significant or not, we could determine this by a direct affirmation from SPSS 
certifying that the correlation were significant at the significance level 0,05 or under. 
If so, the results were statistically significant.   
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6. Results 
6.1 Results for the non-financial firms 
We will start by presenting the correlation between the modified Merton model and 
the CDS spreads for non-financial firms in America and Europe: 
The modified Merton model and CDS spreads 
 
America             2008  
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.642** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.642** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2009 
2010 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.818** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.818** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.740** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.740** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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2011 
	  
As shown by the four columns, there is a strong relationship between the movement 
of the modified Merton model and the CDS spreads, the weakest being a correlation 
of 0.637 and the highest 0.818. All four of the correlations have a 2-tailed significance 
level of 0.01 or under, which suggest that the results are statistically significant.  
We have to acknowledge the fact that the correlation in the boxes is negative. The 
explanation for this is that the modified Merton model is a measurement of distance- 
to-default, which means that a smaller number has a negative effect on its 
creditworthiness. The opposite applies for CDS spreads, as a high credit spread means 
that there is more risk involved with the firm. Therefore, when calculated in SPSS, the 
correlation will appear to be negative. 
If we proceed and look at the results for the non-financial European firms, the 
correlation average is even higher. 
The modified Merton model and CDS spreads 
 
Europe        2008 
 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.637** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.637** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.885** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.885** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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2009 
 
2010 
 	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2011 
 
As mentioned, the correlation results suggest an even stronger relationship between 
the modified Merton model and CDS spreads for European non-financial firms 
compared to American firms in the same category. All four tests show significance at 
the 0.01 level.  
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.902** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.902** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.885** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.885** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.872** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.872** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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The results for non-financial firms in both America and Europe show a significant 
correlation between the modified Merton model and CDS spreads. By computing the 
same test for the credit rating agency Moody’s, we can analyze if the CDS spreads are 
correlated with Moody’s credit ratings. The results are as follow for non-financial 
firms in America and Europe respectively: 
Moody’s and CDS spreads 
 
America          2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.681** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 24 24 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.681** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.823** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 24 24 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.823** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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2010 
 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.895** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 24 24 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.895** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2011 
 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.931** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 24 24 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.931** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
The correlation between CDS spreads and Moody’s credit ratings are high, and is on 
average higher than for the modified Merton model compared to CDS spreads. Again, 
we have significance at the 0.01 level for every year.  
The correlation between CDS spreads and Moody’s credit ratings are as for previous 
tests, negative. Since a low rating grade is compatible with a high CDS spread, the 
correlation will be negative.  
If we combine all the years with CDS spreads on the Y-axis and Moody’s credit 
ratings on the X-axis, we can see the different CDS spreads for each of the given 
ratings from Moody’s. We can see a negative correlation and our 𝑅! value is 0.356, 
which means that 35.6 % of the CDS spread is explained by the Moody’s credit 
rating. 
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Scatterplot between CDS spreads and Moody’s 
 
America 
 
The correlation results between Moody’s credit ratings and CDS spreads for Europe 
are presented next: 
Moody’s and CDS spreads 
 
Europe 
2008 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.751** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 24 24 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.751** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2009 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.729** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 24 24 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.729** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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2010 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.788** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.788** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2011 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.744** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 25 25 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.744** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 25 25 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
Once again we can see a strong correlation between Moody’s credit ratings and CDS 
spreads. Again, all the tests are significant at the 0.01 level.  
If we make a scatterplot for the results, as made with the American firms, we can see 
an even higher 𝑅! value at 0.493 which means that 49.3% of the CDS spreads are 
explained by the Moody’s credit ratings. As we can see from the scatterplot, the 
higher credit ratings the lower the CDS spreads tend to be.  
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Scatterplot between CDS spreads and Moody’s 
Europe 
 
6.2 Results for the financial firms 
Observing the results for the financial firms, there is still a correlation, but not as 
strong as for non-financial firms. The results for financial firms in the America and 
Europe are as follow: 
The modified Merton model and CDS spreads 
 
America            2008 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
2009 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.500 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .391 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.500 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .391 . 
N 5 5 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.400 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .505 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.400 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .505 . 
N 5 5 
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Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
2010 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.900* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .037 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.900* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 . 
N 5 5 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
2011 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.600 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .285 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.600 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .285 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
We have discovered a correlation between the modified Merton model and CDS 
spreads for financial firms in America, but we have only one test that is statistically 
significant. For 2010 the correlation is 0.9, which indicates a strong correlation, but it 
is only significant at the 0.05 level. The reason for not having enough statistically 
significance could be our low N (the number of firms used in the test). This applies 
for the European financial firms as well. The results are as follow: 
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The modified Merton model and CDS spreads 
 
Europe              2008 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.700 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .188 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.700 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2009 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.700 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .188 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.700 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
2010 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.900* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .037 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.900* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 . 
N 5 5 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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2011 
Correlations 
 ModifiedMerton CDS 
Spearman's rho 
ModifiedMerton 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 1.000 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient .000 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
The correlation between the modified Merton and CDS spreads for financial firms in 
Europe displays a somewhat strong correlation for 2008 and 2009. For 2009 we have 
found a strong correlation and it is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. For 2011, 
we have no correlation at all. By looking at Appendix B, we can find that during the 
Euro crisis, the average CDS spreads for financial firms in Europe rose, while the 
modified Merton model had not adapted to the economical environment of that time. 
We therefore have a low correlation on average.  
The correlation between Moody’s credit ratings and the CDS spreads for financial 
firms in America will be presented next.  
Moody’s and CDS spreads 	  
America            2008 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.600 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .285 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.600 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .285 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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2009 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.300 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .624 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.300 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .624 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2010 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.700 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .188 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.700 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2011 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.700 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .188 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.700 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
As we can see from the results we cannot find enough correlation to achieve any 
statistically significance at any level for any year. This is most certainly because of 
our small N.   
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Moody’s and CDS spreads 
 
Europe           2008 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman’s rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .783 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .118 
N 5 5 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient .783 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .118 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2009 
Correlations 
 CDS Moodys 
Spearman's rho 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 -,053 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,933 
N 5 5 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient -,053 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,933 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
2010 
Correlations 
 CDS Moodys 
Spearman's rho 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 1,000 
N 5 5 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient ,000 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1,000 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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2011 
 
Correlations 
 CDS Moodys 
Spearman's rho 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,527 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,361 
N 5 5 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient ,527 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,361 . 
N 5 5 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
The results for the European financial firms regarding the correlation between 
Moody’s credit ratings and CDS spreads are not statistically significant. By observing 
the correlation results we cannot find any correlation to say that the two variables 
relate to each other.  In fact, the result for 2009 is the only one that shows any sign of 
relation. 	  
6.3 Data put together 2008-2011 
The modified Merton model and CDS spreads 	  
America, financials 
 
Correlations 
 MertonModel CDS 
Spearman's rho 
MertonModel 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 -,397 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,083 
N 20 20 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -,397 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,083 . 
N 20 20 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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Europe, financials 
 
Correlations 
 MertonModel CDS 
Spearman's rho 
MertonModel 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 -,012 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,960 
N 20 20 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -,012 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,960 . 
N 20 20 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
America, non-financials 
 
Correlations 
 MertonModel CDS 
Spearman's rho 
MertonModel 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 -,840** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,000 
N 100 100 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -,840** 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 . 
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
 
Europe, non-financials 
 
Correlations 
 MertonModel CDS 
Spearman's rho 
MertonModel 
Correlation Coefficient 1,000 -,606** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,000 
N 100 100 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -,606** 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 . 
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
If we observe the tables above, we can see a significant correlation between non-
financial firms in America and Europe. However, by putting together all the 
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observations from every year for financial firms, and by that raising our N, we still 
cannot find any significant correlation for either American or European firms.  
Moody’s and CDS spreads 
 
America, financials 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.580** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .007 
N 20 20 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.580** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 . 
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
Europe, financials 
 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.298 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .201 
N 20 20 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.298 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .201 . 
N 20 20 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
America, non-financials 
 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.787** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 96 96 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.787** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 96 96 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
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Europe, non-financials 
Correlations 
 Moodys CDS 
Spearman's rho 
Moodys 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.748** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 97 97 
CDS 
Correlation Coefficient -.748** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 97 97 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The correlation box is copied directly from SPSS 
 
By doing the same test as we did for CDS spreads and the modified Merton model, 
we can further observe that there is still a strong significant correlation for the non-
financial firms regarding CDS spreads and Moody’s credit ratings. For the financial 
firms we have not discovered a significant correlation for the European firms. 
However, the American financial firms do display a significant correlation between 
CDS spreads and Moody´s credit ratings.  
7. Analysis 
The results we have reached from our Spearman rank correlation tests show that there 
is a significant correlation overall between the modified Merton model and the CDS 
spreads, as well as between Moody’s credit ratings and the CDS spreads. We 
therefore believe that CDS spreads statistically qualify as a well accepted credit risk 
measurement. This against the background that credit ratings by a public rating 
institute such as Moody’s are widely trusted by market actors and are used as 
guidelines when investments are made by observing the investment grade ratings 
(Daniels & Jensen 2005). The original Merton model, likewise, is a familiar and a 
good default risk measure based on market information and Byström (2006) shows 
that the modified Merton model matches the original Merton model well.  
The statistical test for financial firms in Europe is the only test that shows no or 
negative correlation. As CDS spreads differ from day to day as a consequence of both 
systematic and unsystematic risk, it takes much information into consideration in a 
short period of time (Jacobs et al. 2010 and Zhang, Zhou & Zhu 2005). Our test 
includes the firms with the most outstanding CDS contracts, which includes two 
Spanish banks. The poor correlation for financial firms in Europe could therefore be 
explained by the ongoing debt crisis in Europe. Since 2009, when the Euro crisis 
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began to emerge, the Spanish banks were facing severe solvency problems 
(Harrington 2011).  
As an effect of the crisis, CDS spreads rose with several bps. Unlike CDS spreads, 
updates of Moody’s credit ratings are an ongoing process between the issuer and 
Moody’s analysts where the issuer is encouraged to deliver essential materials and 
raise concerns about the firm if necessary (Moody’s 2012b). Moody’s is also taking 
current economic environment into consideration. Moody’s credit ratings are 
therefore not updated as often as CDS spreads which in time of crisis has an obvious 
effect on the rank correlation. The modified Merton model uses the volatility of the 
stock price along with the leverage ratio as parameters. The volatility is calculated 
with data from a whole year (250 trading days) and the leverage ratio is a percentage 
from the same year. This has a similar effect on the rank correlation and the results, as 
they do not adapt as quickly as CDS spreads.  
By observing the correlation between our traditional credit risk measurements and the 
CDS spreads for the financial firms in America, the correlation is stronger for 2010 
and 2011 than for 2008 and 2009. The financial crisis in America at the time made the 
spreads rise due to high level of risk and uncertainty in the economic environment 
(Hull, Predescu & White 2004). 
The peculiar events in the financial sector, both in America and in Europe, have 
undoubtedly affected the tests for our financial firms. A recent report from the World 
Bank states that countries with a more liberalized banking system and weak 
supervision have higher co-dependence in their banking sector, especially for 
European and American banks (Anginer & Demirguc-Kunt 2011). 
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Diagram 7.1 
 
 
Source: Noeth & Sengupta (2012) 
  
By studying the Bloomberg graph above, we can see that the volatility of CDS 
spreads for the “distressed Eurozone” (where Spain is included) countries began to 
rise when the Euro crisis took off. In Appendix B we present diagrams for the 
financial and the non-financial sector on how the average value of CDS spreads have 
been fluctuating during 2008 to 2011. These diagrams clarifies that the spreads react 
distinctively on macroeconomic events. As previously mentioned, the modified 
Merton model can differ with relatively small numbers while CDS spreads can differ 
in high number in a short period of time, which will effect the rank correlation. 
We must also acknowledge the fact that our N (number of observations) for financial 
firms are small compared to the non-financial. This is also an important factor to why 
we cannot find any significant correlation between the different methods of measuring 
default risk. If we look at the last results, we have combined all the results for every 
year in one correlation. For financial firms in America, there is a significant 
correlation between Moody’s credit ratings and CDS spreads. Though there is a 
correlation between Moody’s credit ratings and CDS spreads for financial firms in 
Europe, it is not strong enough to show any statistical significance. 
The non-financial firms for both territories show a strong and significant correlation, 
despite the financial crisis in our timespan. As previously mentioned, there are several 
reports indicating that financial institutions are more volatile in financial crisis and we 
therefore have a hard time finding any significant correlation for these. Anginer & 
Demirguc-Kunt (2011) wrote that the increased interdependence globally in the 
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banking industry (with similar risk and market exposure) makes it more volatile in 
times of “economic, liquidity and information shocks”. Banks in developed countries 
especially (e.g. America and countries in the EU), have experienced a higher co-
dependence (Anginer & Demirguc-Kunt 2011). 
Consequently, regarding the CDS market, the spreads for banks have increased when 
there has been a shock in the credit market resulting in higher spreads for globally 
interconnected banks due to systematic risk (Miquel, Lukac & Gonzalez-Urteaga 
2012). The financial situation in the market is therefore important to bear in mind 
when analyzing why our correlation is not statistically significant. 
8. Conclusion 
This report on the relationship between CDS spreads, the modified Merton model and 
Moody’s credit ratings aims to give a contribution to an increased discussion on credit 
risk measures. By comparing these different credit risk indicators we would like to 
point out how they behave in relation to some common parameters in the credit risk 
environment. 
By testing the CDS spreads against the modified Merton’s distance-to-default 
measure and the credit ratings from Moody’s, we are able to show that CDS spreads 
are plausible indicators of default risk. We are able to make this assumption since 
credit ratings from Moody’s are well accepted by the market as a measure of default 
risk (Daniels & Jensen 2005) and the modified Merton model is based on a well-used 
traditional estimator of default risk (Byström 2006).   
Essentially, we find our correlation results for non-financial firms to be statistically 
significant for both the American and the European market, as we in this case found 
strong correlations both between CDS spreads and the modified Merton measure, as 
well as between CDS spreads and Moody’s ratings. However, we cannot show the 
same for the financials firms. 
It is of importance to bear in mind the financial situation in the market when drawing 
conclusions of the correlations. In times of financial distress there are some measures 
that react faster than others.  In the case of the European financial firms, where we 
could not find any correlation between either CDS spreads and the modified Merton 
model or CDS spreads and Moody´s credit ratings, the CDS spreads fluctuated 
substantially. We draw the conclusion that CDS spreads react more distinctively to 
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shocks in the market than credit ratings and the modified Merton’s distance-to-default 
measure. Previous reports do indeed support the fact that CDS spreads faster adapt to 
anomalies in the market, which have had an obvious effect on the rankings and 
therefore the correlation of the financial firms.  
When to assess which of the measures that is the most reliable when it comes to credit 
risk, it is impossible to say, this because none of the firms in the report has yet to 
default. In conclusion, we would like to stress the fact that the measures used in this 
thesis are not a guarantee of default; they should rather be seen as indicators of 
probability of default.   
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Appendix B 	  
Average CDS spreads for American non-financial firms 
 
 
 
Average CDS spreads for European non-financial firms 
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Average CDS spreads for American financial firms 
 
 
Average CDS spreads for European financial firms 
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Appendix C 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011
America
Lennar&Corporation Ba3 9 B2 7 B2 7 B2 7
Sprint&Nextel&Corporation Baa3 12 Ba2 10 Ba3 9 B1 8
Fifth& &Pacific&Companies,&INC Ba1 11 Ba3 9 B3 6 B3 6
Limited&Brands.&INC Ba1 11 Ba2 10 Ba2 10 Ba1 11
Gannett&CO,&INC. A3 15 Ba2 10 Ba2 10 Ba2 10
Supervalu&INC. Ba3 9 Ba3 9 Ba3 9 B1 8
R.R.&Donnelley& &Sons&Company Baa2 13 Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Ba1 11
The&Jones&Group&INC. Ba1 11 Ba2 10 Ba2 10 Ba2 10
J.C.&Penney&Company,&INC. * * * * * * * *
Whirlpool&Corporation Baa2 13 Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Baa3 12
Alcoa&INC. Baa1 14 Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Baa3 12
Safeway&INC. Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
LouisianaTPacific&Corporation Ba2 10 Ba3 9 B2 7 Ba3 9
Verizon&Communications&INC. A3 15 A3 15 A3 15 A3 15
Macy's&INC. Baa3 12 Ba2 10 Ba1 11 Ba1 11
Southwest&Airlines&CO. Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa3 12 Baa3 12
CBS&Corporation Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Baa2 13
Universal&Health&Services,&INC. Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Ba2 10 Ba2 10
The&McClatchy&Company Ba3 9 Caa2 4 Caa1 5 Caa1 5
HewlettTPackard A2 16 A2 16 A2 16 A2 16
The&Kroger&Company Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
Autozone,&INC. Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
Nordstrom,&INC. Baa1 14 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa1 14
Altria&Group,&INC. Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14
The&New&York&Times&Company Baa3 14 B1 8 B1 8 B1 8
Europe
Continental&Aktiengesellschaft Ba1 11 Ba3 9 B1 8 Ba3 9
Telecom&Italia&SPA Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
Daimler&AG A3 15 A3 15 A3 15 A3 15
Deutsche&Telekom&AG Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14
Telefonica,&S.A. Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14
Peugeot&SA * * Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Baa3 12
France&Telecom A3 15 A3 15 A3 15 A3 15
Wolkswagen&Aktiengesellschaft A3 15 A3 15 A3 15 A3 15
Portugal&TelecomInternational&Finance&B.V Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa3 12
Brittish&Telecommunications&PBL&LTD&company Baa1 14 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
Lafarge Baa2 13 Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Ba1 11
Renault Baa2 13 Ba1 11 Ba1 11 Ba1 11
Enel&S.P.A. A2 16 A2 16 A2 16 A3 15
Vodafone&Group&Public&Limited&Company Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14 A3 15
Valeo Baa3 12 Ba2 10 Ba1 11 Baa3 12
Edp&T&Engergias&de&Portugal,&S.A. A2 16 A3 16 A3 16 Baa3 12
Deutsche&Lufthansa&Aktiegesellschaft Baa3 12 Ba1 11 Ba1 11 Ba1 11
Vivendi Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
Stora&Enso&OYJ Ba1 11 Ba2 10 Ba2 10 Ba2 10
Gas&Natural&SDG&SA * * * * Baa2 13 Baa2 13
FIAT&S.P.A Ba1 11 Ba1 11 Ba1 11 Ba2 10
Aktiebolaget&Volvo A3 15 Baa2 13 Baa2 13 Baa2 13
Marks& &Spencer Baa2 13 Baa3 12 Baa3 12 Baa3 12
Wolters&Kluwer&N.V. Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14 Baa1 14
UPMTKymmene&OYJ Baa3 12 Ba1 11 Ba1 11 Ba1 11
America
Bank&of&America AT 11 D 3 CT 5 CT 5
MBIA&insurance A2 16 B3 6 B3 6 B3 6
Morgan&Stanley A1 17 A2 16 A2 16 A2 16
Goldman&Sachs B 9 BT 8 BT 8 BT 8
JPMorgan&Chase& &Co. Aa2 19 Aa3 18 Aa3 18 Aa3 18
Europe
Banco&Santander,&S.A B 9 BT 8 BT 8 BT 8
Deutsche&Bank&Aktiengesellschaft B 9 B 9 C+ 7 C+ 7
Commerzbank&Aktiengesellschaft C 6 CT 5 CT 5 CT 5
The&Royal&Bank&of&Scotland&Public B 9 CT 5 CT 5 CT 5
Intesa&SauPaulo&SPA BT 8 BT 8 BT 8 C+ 7
